My intentions in this contribution are of a modest nature only. What interests me is to see in what ways Gilbert, when speaking of divinity, distinguishes between different uses of language. In order to do so I shall look into the things he has to say about this subject in his commentaries on Boethius.
3 First of all, there are manners of expression that derive their proper meaning from the world of the transcendent but can also be conveniently used for things in the created world. There is also one term at least, viz. persona, that has a sublunar source and is applied to God, and in fact, to the mystery of the Trinity.
The objective of this contribution, is to explore Gilbert's ideas as to how the significates of terms are influenced when transportation from one domain to the other takes place. Specific attention will be given to the concepts the theologian uses to explain the relationships between different uses of one and the same term. First I shall deal with those linguistic expressions that have their real meaning in the Transcendent Domain (sections 1.1-1.3). Next, the notion of forma will be looked into (section 2). Finally, the notion of persona as applied to the Divine Persons will be considered (section 3).
The transcendent source of linguistic expressions:
the notions of esse, bonum and unum
The concept of "esse
As is to be expected in a Neoplatonic theory, of pivotal importance in Gilbert's semantics is the role played by the term being. Of course in such a metaphysics, the only thing that can be truly said to be is God. That is to say, all other entities have somehow derived their being from that First Cause. Thus their being is on a different level, and the way in which they can be said to be must be understood in terms of the different principles at work in them. Put otherwise, for the created things it is true to say that they 'are something' {esse aliquid), but for God it is not. 4 His being is not restricted in any way.
5 Put otherwise, whereas created being is always something qualified, God is not. De Rijk remarks that it is therefore unfortunate that Gilbert should say that God is qualis (de Rijk (1988a) Although he is great, he is not thus in virtue of quantity; although he is of a certain kind, he is not thus in virtue of a quality; although he endures, he does not in virtue of temporality.
Perhaps de Rijk's translating qualis into 'qualitative' is the source of misunderstanding. I think the only thing that Gilbert is trying to say here is that when we say certain things about God (when we apply greatness to Him), when we consider Him to be of a certain kind (wise, good, just, and so on), no restrictions are involved at all, even though when we apply these same expressions to created entités they suggest a limitation of being.
That God truly is, whereas other things than He derive their being from that Source, has its effect on the way in which the word 'esse' is used for the created beings, and the same goes for the label 'essentia'. In Gilbert's words:
In De Trin. I, 2, 45, pp. 87 63 -88 69 : Essentia vero, que Principium est, omnia creata precedit: illis omnibus, ut "esse" dicantur, impertiens et a nullo alio, ut ipsa sit, sumens. ... Et cum de ea quis loquens dicit "essentia est", sic debet intelligi: Essentia est ilia res QUE EST IPSUM ESSE i.e. que non ab alio hanc mutuat dictionem ET EX QUA EST ESSE i.e. que ceteris omnibus eandem quadam extrinseca participatione communicat.
